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PERSONAL, LIVING OR FAMILY MATTERS 
AND THE VALUE ADDED TAX 
L. Hart Wright 
EDITORS' INTRODUCTION* 
Periodically, a federal tax on consumption expenditures is suggested 
as a means of raising revenue, lowering income taxes, discouraging con-
sumption, and encouraging saving. In 1979, Chairman Al Ullman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee offered the Tax Restructuring Act of 
1979, ** which was designed to institute a value added tax (VA.T) in the 
United States. Such a tax would be levied on the value added to each 
taxable item in the course of production. The tax would be collected at 
the point of sale to the ultimate consumer. 
Whr1e the introduction of the bill generated much comment, Professor 
Wright noted that no one had considered the need to define the bases -
i e., the goods and/ or services - on which the "01. T would be levied. Pro-
fessor Wright had long been interested in the problems that European 
countries faced in defining the bases for their value added taxes. That 
background rendered him particularly well-qual[fted to analyze the "01. T 
base problems that the United States would confront. 
What follows is the only written portion of what Professor Wright had 
planned as a much wider project. It is set out here with minimal altera-
tions. Professor Wright prepared the numbered footnotes; those with an 
asterisk were prepared by the editors. 
INTRODUCTION 
No tax is ever implemented in a manner which is perfectly re-
sponsive to the logical implications of its basic purpose. VAT is no 
exception. 
Those who foster this tax basically intend that ultimate tax inci-
dence be su.ff ered only by individuals and then only in the degree to 
which they dip into society's pool of consumer-type goods and serv-
ices. But their implementing legislation is always designed to fall 
short of reaching all consumer-type goods and services. Ullman's 
proposed Tax Restructuring Act of 1979 would have been no excep-
• The editors wish to express their appreciation to Professor Wright's Research Associate, 
Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, for her help in preparing both the editors' introduction and Professor 
Wright's text. 
.. H.R. 5665, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also 125 CONG. REC. 29,059 (containing a 
reprint of a press release by Rep. Ullman su=arizing H.R. 5665). 
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tion. Under it, a substantial proportion of all such benefits actually 
would have been excluded. 
Of the wide array of economic benefits which could have been 
consumed without tax incidence, imputed consumer-type benefits 
(e.g., intra-family household services) were the largest in value. Also 
enjoying immunity would have been marketplace acquisitions of 
certain necessities (in order of monetary importance - food, hous-
ing, education, and medical care), and annual imputed income or 
benefits from current family use ( deemed "services") of its own dura-
ble goods. 
I. NON-MARKETPLACE INTRA-FAMILY SERVICES 
The Ullman bill conformed to foreign practice in treating the 
"performance of services" 1 as a "taxable transaction"2 ff the transac-
tion itself was of a "commercial-type."3 However, this category, in 
the case of individuals, definitely extended only to those transactions 
carried out "in connection with a business ."4 In consequence, as is 
also true abroad, intra-family household services simply would not 
have been reached by the proposed act. 
To accord tax immunity to these services was an important policy 
determination. These intra-family services make up a large share of 
all consumed services. Indeed, female homemakers' services alone 
had an estimated production value of $555.1 billion in 1978,5 an ob-
viously substantial figure when compared with that year's total mar-
ketplace consumer expenditures of $1,340.1 billion.6 
However important, that policy determination was not unex-
pected. In this country, intra-family services constantly have en-
joyed tax immunity, being beyond the reach of state sales taxes as 
well as the federal income tax. 7 As to the policy implications, in an 
1. H.R. 5565, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. § 4003(2) (1979) (hereinafter cited as Tax Restructuring 
Act of 1979]. 
2. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I, § 4003. 
3. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I, § 4003. 
4. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I, § 4004 (a)(2)(emphasis added). 
5. Estimated by extending across the nation data compiled for the Phoenix, Arizona Met-
ropolitan area in McPheters, The Economic Value of a Homemaker in Maricopa Counl)~ 25 
ARIZ. Bus., Feb. 1978, at 10-14. The estimate represents an amount equal to 32.7% of per-
sonal income otherwise derived from the marketplace in 1978. See DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 443 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES] (listing total personal income for 1978 as $1,708 billion). 
6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 435. 
1. See generally B. EITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 80-85 (5th ed. 
1980) (a general discussion of imputed income containing an excerpt from W. VICKERY, 
AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1947)). 
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abstract sense such an immunity no doubt does tend to encourage a 
wife to confine her productive activities to the home, prompting 
some to oppose it - deeming that life-style outmoded and an "un-
justified financial burden" on the entire nation. 8 
But probably decisive in preserving the immunity everywhere is 
the practical problem, if the law were otherwise, of trying to enforce 
accurate valuations. The task would be insurmountable, beyond the 
administrative capability of any agency. Such intra-family services 
are of infinite types and quality, with all normally being performed 
without any thought of record keeping. They range from the diverse 
quality of shaves, which men provide themselves, and of lawn main-
tenance and mechanical work they so frequently perform for the 
family, to grocery buying, cooking, housecleaning,- childcare and 
sewing more often undertaken by wives (but also with varying de-
grees of skill, time, and attention). 
However, this particular argument, supporting immunity for 
such services, is scant justification in the case of married couples for 
the Ullman bill's extension of a comparable immunity to the more 
than seven billion dollars in marketplace transactions involving do-
mestic services performed for households by paid domestic servants 
numbering, in 1978, 1.4 million persons.9 However, that extension 
does put single working females who must hire babysitters for their 
children on a par with those married couples where one spouse per-
sonally provides such care tax free. 
Technically, freedom from tax on the compensation for such 
hired household services would spring from the fact that the bill, as 
does its foreign counterparts, excluded "employees" from the "taxa-
ble persons" 10 category with respect to activities engaged in as em-
ployees. In the more normal setting of an individually owned 
commercial enterprise, this technical exclusion of employees from 
that "taxable person" category would not result in actually freeing 
from tax the values the employees add. In that setting, a yet addi-
tional or second step occurs. The owner-employer normally includes 
the employees' compensation as a cost in figuring the employer's 
own price for his saleable products and, to this, he tacks on an addi-
tional amount for his own profit. Then, as a "taxable person," he 
completes that second step via a "taxable transaction" (sale) in 
8. See Cuvillier, The Housewife: An Unjust!fted Financial Burden on the Community, 8 J. OF 
Soc. POLY. I (1979). 
9. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 403. 
IO. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I, § 4005(b). 
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which the ultimate consumer is charged an amount of tax covering 
all of the values added. 
This latter second step, so essential to the roundabout way of ap-
plying the tax to value added by employees, is not reached, however, 
in the household situation. For the household employer does not go 
on to sell the values generated by his household servant and is not, 
therefore, a "taxable person." 11 Instead, he is the ultimate consumer 
of what becomes tax free service. Again, by way of contrast, there 
typically is a separate special provision which does tax the individual 
proprietor of a "business" if he personally consumes his own business 
property or services, 12 but the householder -as such - never comes 
within that provision; as a householder, he clearly is not engaged in a 
"business." 
But in this particular instance, even though the household-em-
ployer's immunity clashes with a basic standard of horizontal equity, 
in actual fact little revenue would have been modified so as to bring 
household employees within the taxable category. For that bill 
otherwise provided a "de minimus" exception under which an indi-
vidual whose taxable transactions did not exceed $10,000 a year 
could elect not to be treated as a "taxable person."13 
Theory aside, the foregoing indicates that a family that either 
performs its own household chores or utilizes a servant-employee to 
that end will suffer less tax incidence than would be incurred if the 
family had utilized the services of an independent entrepreneur. The 
latter, being a "taxable person" engaged in a "business," would be 
entering a "taxable transaction" in performing the service, and his 
invoice to the householder would set forth the requisite tax. Thus, 
possibly prejudiced, at least in a tax sense, will be those parents who 
send an infant to an organized profit-making childcare center (in lieu 
of hiring an in-house babysitter) or who hire a "maid service" in-
stead of a cleaning woman. 
II. FAMILY HOUSING 
Out of all the problems created by VAT, those associated with 
housing not only are troublesome per se but apparently also defy any 
completely satisfactory solution. Each of the four principal altema-
11. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I, § 4005(a). 
12. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I, § 4033. 
13. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, supra note I,§ 4023(a) (Taxpayers can elect not to be 
treated as a taxable person if their taxable transactions do not exceed $10,000 for the calendar 
year and their taxable transactions for the next year are reasonably expected not to exceed 
$10,000.). 
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tive ways in which VAT might deal with housing is defective, but the 
defects of each do vary in type and, more importantly, in 
significance. 
Listed below are the four methods available to deal with the VAT 
dilemma posed by housing, followed by a discussion of the problems 
created by each one:* 
(A) Application of VAT's basic pattern without modification; (B) A 
modification: Taxing all purchases with rents being exempt; (C) A 
modification: Taxing only rents and, as to owner-occupants, imputed 
use value; and (D) A modification: Complete exemption. 
A. Application of "VA.T's Basic Tax Patterns Without Mod!fication 
Application ofVAT's normal tax pattern to housing would mean 
that the sale of a new home to one who intends to be an owner-
occupant would be a taxable event, giving rise to a tax on the entire 
purchase price. A renter, on the other hand, would suffer VAT only 
on a piecemeal basis, as monthly rent is paid. While his landlord 
would have suffered a full tax on the entire purchase price at the 
time he first purchased the new property, that fact actually would not 
have resulted in any net gain in government revenue. That tax 
would have been rebated through a credit or refund allowed to the 
landlord, since his acquisition represented an investment for use in a 
business (!.e., in an activity regularly engaged in for profit). 
But no such credit or refund would be available to an ·owner-
occupant as to the tax he suffered on his acquisition. He would have 
acquired the home for personal use, as distinguished from the busi-
ness use. 
To apply the foregoing tax pattern (the first of four methods that 
VAT might use) to housing would create the troublesome problems 
discussed below. 
1. A Windfall Effect. 
The first but also the least enduring of those problems concerns 
the large transition-generating windfall which enactment of such a 
tax automatically would accord to all of the then present owner-oc-
cupants of homes. 
Because VAT's collection arrangement is transactional in nature, 
no tax would be applied to those existing homes resided in by owner-
occupants until a later time, when those persons finally enter into a 
* Editors' Note: Professor Wright finished only his discussion of the first method. The 
others are presented here only to indicate the direction that the unfinished portion of his work 
would have taken. 
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commercial transaction terminating residence in that particular 
house. In effect, even if VAT would be imposed on their subsequent 
post-enactment sale (or rental) of what then would be second-hand 
housing, it is their vendee who actually would suffer that tax. Thus, 
a large proportion of our forty-nine million 14 pre-enactment owner-
occupants would have enjoyed tax free housing for a substantial pe-
riod. That it would be for a substantial period is evident from the 
fact that owner-occupants now continue to reside in the same home 
for a median period of seven years. 15 And this opportunity to con-
tinue to reside in a home not burdened with a ten percent VAT might 
tempt many such persons to live in their then existing stock of homes 
for a longer period than prior experience would suggest. Further, 
even now one-fourth of all owner-occupants stay in the same house 
for over eighteen years. 16 
Thus, the tax preference or windfall for many such persons 
would involve a substantial amount even though the median value 
of our existing stock of homes is below the healthy $67,300 median 
value of 1979's new homes. 
Moreover, assuming a VAT rate of ten percent, in the case of an 
owner-occupied home worth $50,000 at the time of enactment, the 
government is likely to suffer more than mere deferral of $5,000 in 
tax. Assuming a stable economy, when that house is sold, say seven 
years later, the government's take from the sale is likely to be less 
than $5,000, for presumably the house's value will have depreciated 
in the course of the post-enactment period during which the earlier 
owner-occupant continued to reside therein, resulting in a less than 
$50,000 post-enactment sale price. 
To avoid a windfall to pre-enactment owner-occupants, it would 
be necessary, at the time of enactment, to impose a full value added 
tax on all of the then existing stock of owner-occupied houses. In all 
likelihood this would be a political impossibility, given the enormous 
number of such homes (forty-nine million in 1979) and the further 
fact that those homes shelter an even greater number of potential 
voters. Further, except for the then most recent acquisitions, would 
not the problem of valuing all such homes lead to an administrative 
nightmare and litigation galore? 
14. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Annual Housing Survey: 1977, Part A, 
General Housing Characteristics TABLE A- 1, p.1.[hereinafter cited as Annual Housing 
Survey]. 
15. See Annual Housing Survey: 1977 Part A supra note 14, at 6. 
16. See id 
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2. Co'!flict with "VA. T's Twin Goals. 
A second problem, should VAT's unusual tax pattern be applied 
to housing, would emerge from what then would become an inherent 
conflict between VAT's collection arrangement and that tax's twin 
goals. 
VAT's twofold reasons for being are (i) to tax only consumption, 
thereby (ii) freeing investments or savings from its reach. The con-
flict in. question would be generated because in some transactions a 
person's investment (or savings) is separated from his consumption 
only in time. VAT's collection arrangement, however, as it impacts 
on ultimate consumers, is not geared to time as such. It is, as noted 
before, purely transactional in nature. 17 Thus, a conflict between 
VAT's twin goals will arise wherever durable goods, purchased for 
immediate personal use (a type of consumption), generate immedi-
ate tax incidence on the entire value. 
Such acquisitions, in varying but often substantial degrees, si-
multaneously consititute (whether or not deliberately) savings, or an 
investment which, if that component alone had been involved, would 
not have suffered current tax incidence either because it would be 
beyond the tax's reach (e.g. , corporate stock) or because the buyer 
would enjoy a credit or refund (property to be used in a business). 
Purchase of a new house by one who intends to be an owner-
occupant is simply the most dramatic example of a type of transac-
tion which has a dual nature - partly consumption, partly invest-
ment. Thus, to apply a tax on the entire purchase price would build 
into VAT a relative bias against this particular major form of in-
vestment or savings. That it is a major form of investment is evident 
from the fact that in 1979 owner-occupants' investment in homes 
represented about twenty two percent of the assets of all indi-
viduals.18 
Indeed, the bias against this form of investment would be even 
greater than appears at first blush, for to tax the entire purchase price 
immediately is to tax a much larger sum than even the actual current 
personal savings component involved in the average purchaser's ac-
quisition of a home. That family's initial personal investment - a 
mere down payment - represents only a portion of the purchase 
price. The balance represents a liability (mortgage), not personal 
17. Cost of Owning A Home: Going Through the Roof, 87 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Dec. 10, 1979, at 76. 
18. Indeed, collection practices aside, from the consumer's standpoint, the tax base itself, in 
contrast to that of an income tax, is also purely transactional in character, not being geared to 
any given tax-reckoning period. 
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savings. In the business sector, however, the application of VAT to 
the entire sales price, not merely to an owner-occupant's equity, 
would not create a comparable problem. The purchaser of property 
acquired for use in a business would be entitled, more or less imme-
diately, to a credit or refund of the tax which had been paid. 
In the end, the argument for taxing the whole (including the in-
vestment or savings and also any liability assumed) must rest on the 
fact that the purchaser, though satisfying twin goals ( consumption 
and investment), in fact has withdrawn from society's pool of re-
sources, for his exclusive personal use, the entire property. But even 
this argument ignores the actual transitory nature of the withdrawal: 
though our owner-occupant originally acquired a fee simple, his 
ownership is never permanent. It bears repeating: the median own-
er-occupant's period of residency in a particular home is only seven 
years, 19 following which he may purchase another new and probably 
larger home and again suffer a tax on the whole price. 
Discussed later is the need for sales of such "second-hand" resi-
dences to be immunized from VAT in whole or in part so that the 
first owner-occupants can pass on to their own subsequent vendees, 
as part of the price, a portion of the earlier paid tax. Otherwise, the 
purchasers of new homes (for whatever reason) would incur VAT on 
the full purchase price of their successive purchases - with the me-
dian period between purchases being only seven years. 
3. Owner-occupants v. Renters. 
Should VAT's usual tax pattern be applied to new housing, a 
third problem would emerge from three differences in the impact on 
an owner-occupant and a tenant. The total net effect would be unfa-
vorable to tenants as a class. 
However, if viewed in isolation, the first such difference (the tim-
ing of tax incidence) actually may favor that tenant class. As noted 
earlier, the purchaser of a new previously unoccupied house would, 
upon its purchase, pay the entire VAT thereon. If the purchaser is an 
owner-occupant, the full amount would go into the treasury; if a 
landlord, the purchaser would be entitled to a refund or credit since 
the property's acquisition represented an investment for use in a busi-
ness (i.e., in a commercial activity regularly carried on for profit). 
His tenant, however, would enjoy piecemeal deferment of the VAT 
19. See E. STEURLE, Is INCOME FROM CAPITAL SUBJECT To INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXA• 
TION? No. 42 (1980). 
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attributable to his use, making staggered payments of VAT with each 
payment of rent as it becomes due. 
The tenant's normally attractive opportunity to defer VAT, 
whether or not ultimately advantageous, clearly would be disadvan-
tageous under two sets of circumstances: during the period immedi-
ately following the adoption of VAT and during any period of 
inflation. 
Persons owning their own homes at the time of first enactment 
would benefit from a previously discussed windfall, ie. , they could 
continue thereafter to reside in that particular home without ever 
personally having suffered tax incidence. Renters, on the other hand, 
would encounter a taxable event on making their first rental pay-
ment following VAT's enactment. 
Also, during inflationary periods, the timing difference in VAT's 
impact on the two classes would prejudice the tenant class. Owner-
occupants, paying VAT only once, at the time of purchase, will find 
the amount of tax borne unaffected by their homes' subsequent infla-
tionary increase in value. Rent, however, presumably increases with 
inflation, beginning in a given case at that time when a tenant next 
renewed his typical one-year lease. In consequence, also increasing 
at that point would be the amount of tax incidence periodically 
suffered. 
Yet another difference between the effects on the two classes 
(owner-occupants and tenants) may appear, at first impression, to 
favor the tenant class. Since the latter's payments are periodic and 
cover only currently consumed use value, the typical tenant himself 
would not suffer tax incidence with respect to the long-term invest-
ment component in any given home. In short, he would not pay 
VAT on that portion of the house's original cost attributable to future 
uses by succeeding tenants. A purchaser, on the other hand, even if 
subsequently able to pass on to a succeeding purchaser (via an ad-
justment of the sales price) an appropriate part of the VAT previ-
ously suffered, will have prepaid the tax on the long-term investment 
component, since, on his own purchase, the tax paid was measured 
by the property's entire value. 
The differential in their respective tax bases, coupled with the 
timing variation, produces, in terms of effects on the two classes, an-
other important disparity best described by illustration, with the end 
result being unfavorable to the tenant class. 
Assume the following: the economy is stable, a house (land 
aside) cost $40,000, a landlord acquired it with cash from his own 
funds, the house had a useful life of forty years, depreciation is most 
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accurately reflected under the straight line method (here, at 2.5% or 
$1,000 annually), annual real property taxes will equal 2.5% of the 
declining value, and the going market rate of interest is ten percent. 
Assume further, a ten percent net profit after expenses, and that 
both it and all of the foregoing expenses are covered by rents re-
ceived from succeeding tenants. Over the forty-year period, the ten-
ants then will pay total rent of $142,500 and, under a ten percent 
VAT, a total VAT of $14,250. In contrast, the owner-occupant, on 
acquiring in fee simple a comparable $40,000 house, would pay a 
mere $4,000 VAT. 
Although the tenant class pays a much larger amount of VAT 
($14,250 v. $4,000), much of the $10,250 difference actually is not 
prejudicial to the tenant class, arising as it does from the normal 
disparity between (i) the present value (based here on a ten percent 
discount rate) of the future staggered rents, and (ii) the actt{al sum of 
those future rents. But, as the table shows, this disparity accounts for 
the differential only insofar as the rental payments cover two of the 
three factors: 
I II III 
Factor Actual Dollar Present Value 
amount over of column I 
40 years at 10% rate 
(Owner• 
(Renter) occupant) 
1. 10% Profit on declining 
value $82,000 $30,221 
2. S.L. Depreciation ($1,000 
annually) $40,000 $ 9,779 
3. Total: Profit & 
Depreciation $122,000 $40,000 
4. 10% VAT attributable to 
profit plus depreciation 
totals in line 3 $ 12,200 $ 4,000 
Observe from the foregoing table that the $40,000 purchase price 
paid by our owner-occupant (line 2, column III) precisely equals the 
present value of that portion of the future rents which tenants would 
pay to cover the landlord's (i) future staggered profit and (ii) depreci-
ation (the total in line 3, column I, $122,000). Comparably, the 
$4,000 VAT paid in a single sum by the owner-occupant (at the time 
of his $40,000 purchase) is the present value of future staggered VAT 
payments of $12,200 (out of the total $14,250 in VAT payments) 
which tenants would suffer on that portion of their rental payments 
covering those same two factors (profit and depreciation). Thus, if 
"time is money," then to the foregoing extent the tenant class, though 
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paying a larger actual amount, in reality was not prejudiced. The 
added amount paid ($12,200 versus $4,000) covering the two previ-
ously mentioned factors was nothing more than the "interest" cost of 
their deferral advantage or, conversely, was the relative "discount" 
garnered by owner-occupants for their prepayment of tax covering 
all future use. 
No similar explanation, however, is available with respect to the 
remaining $2,050 of actual VAT payments suffered by the tenants 
($14,250 - $12,200 = $2,050). That added amount was attributable 
to the third factor covered by their rental payments, namely, to the 
$20,500 in real property taxes which the landlord must pay over the 
forty-year period. That which was a real property tax qua "tax" to 
the landlord ($20,500) was passed through to the tenant as rent qua 
"rent" and, thus, as such, was a portion of the total amount on which 
tenants actually would pay a ten percent VAT ($2,050). But to an 
owner-occupant, the $22,500 in real property taxes paid over the 
same forty-year period remained a tax qua "tax" (being an exaction 
imposed directly on him by government to defray general govern-
mental expenses) and, as such, normally would be exempt from 
VAT.20 And to this extent, owner-occupants obviously would have 
an advantage over the tenant class. 
But it must be emphasized that this rests on an assumption about 
which there is considerable dispute among economists. That under-
lying assumption, advanced as a theory particularly up through the 
1960's, holds that real property taxes are shifted by property owners 
to those who consume the goods and services derived from the taxed 
property, ie., tenants in the case ofrental property, consumers in the 
case of property used by business, commercial, and industrial 
enterprises.21 
This assumption normally is not indulged in, however, in the 
case of unimproved land. That the supply of land is finite leads econ-
omists quite generally to conclude that the landowner in fact will 
bear the tax in that, when such a tax is first imposed or increased, the 
value of his land will fall by the capitalized value of the tax. 22 
Further, in the case of reproducible capital such as housing, yet 
another basic theory evolved during the 1970's, with the ultimate 
conclusion turning on the also debated question of whether the sup-
20. See note 15 supra. 
21. The reasoning which follows in the text is valid on a pro tanto basis even if it be 
assumed that landlords, on average, are able to pass through only a portion, say half, of their 
real property tax. 
22. See Blake, Property Tax Incidence: An Alternative View, 55 LAND EcoN. 521. (1979). 
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ply of savings was responsive to the rate of return. To the extent the 
supply of savings was so responsive, increases in real property taxes 
would "discourage new investment" in housing thereby reducing 
"the supply of new buildings," facilitating increases in rents which, 
to that extent, passed the tax to tenants.23 But if the supply of sav-
ings was only partly responsive to the rate of return, to the extent it 
was not, the tax would be borne by the owners of all capital, as in the 
case of unimproved land.24 The pivotal point here is the fact that a 
VAT will not unfairly discriminate against tenants to the extent the 
real property tax is not borne by them in the form of higher rents 
which do suffer VAT. 
The cost of repairs and the VAT attributable to such were not 
included in our illustration. While such costs inevitably are involved 
in housing, they were ignored here because they normally would be 
borne directly or indirectly by both classes and on a scattered basis. 
Relatively unimportant is the further fact that piecemeal accommo-
dation of these costs typically will vary somewhat between the two 
classes. 
Nor would the introduction of a mortgage and an interest factor 
generate significant additional differences between owner-occupants 
and renters. Our owner-occupant would have paid the same $4,000 
in VAT at the time he purchased a $40,000 house even if it had been 
heavily mortgaged. The fact that he thereafter would have paid in-
terest (thus deflecting what otherwise would have been profit to him) 
would not have created any additional VAT liability, for such pay-
ments are quite traditionally exempt from VAT. While a landlord 
may be .expected to include the cost of interest in the rent charged, 
that should have little actual effect on the tenant's rent since inclu-
sion of the interest component in his rent should simultaneously 
serve to reduce the landlord's own net profit component. 
23. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 261 (3d ed. 1977). 
24. See H. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX? 39-52 (1975). 
